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This study (2':) concludes t h a t  
loca t iona l  f a c t o r ,  not only in s ide  
s p a t i a l  s c a l e s .  T h i s  f ind ing  is 
among academics, and aga ins t  what 
tax d i f f e r e n t i a l s  may be an important 
metropolitan a reas ,  but .also a t  o ther  
aga ins t  what it is  commonly be l ieve  
I expect a t  t h e  onset of my research. 
This conclusion i s  reached a f t e r  proving t h a t  t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  i n  many 
cases can increase  o r  decrease p r o f i t s  more than any o ther  cos t  
d i f f e r e n t i a l ,  a f t e r  c r i t i c i z i n g  the  l i t e r a t u r e  on t he  i s sue ,  and a f t e r  
refuting t h e  main t h e o r e t i c a l  arguments aga ins t  t h e  e f f e c t s  of taxes on 
loca t ion .  This r e s u l t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  relevant for  those businesses 
whose revenues do riot depend on being i n  a s p e c i f i c  loca t ion .  In  terms 
of number of establ.ishments they may not be very important. But i n  terms 
of employment they may represent a la rge  proportion of a t  l e a s t  
manufacturing and wholesale. And among manufacturing, t h e  high 
technology firms may be one of t h e  s ec to r s  more' s e n s i t i v e  t o  t ax  
d i f f e r e n t i a l s .  
1:LITERATURE REVIEW: 
The Most Extended Opinion Among; Scholars --
The majority of scholars agree t h a t  t ax  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  a r e  a minor 
f a c t o r  i n  t h e  loca t ion  of manufacturing. For example, H.  L .  Hunker sa id :  
"It is s a f e  t o  say t h a t  taxes ,  as  such, r a r e l y  play a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  
i n  t h e  loca t ion  dec is ion ,  a l l  t h e  publ ic  'no ise '  nothwithstanding. There 
are remarkably few documented examples i n  which s t a t e  o r  loca l  taxes . 
were compelling f ac to r s  i n  e i t h e r  a t t r a c t i n g  an indus t ry  t o  a region o r  
influencing i t s  decision t o  leave (l)", and "almost every r e l i a b l e  
source  argues t h a t  taxes a r e  not s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  i n d u s t r i a l  loca t ion  
decisions and t h e  many surveys of such decisions support t h i s  
contention. But, Seymour Harris po in ts  out t h a t  t he  problem ' l i e s  i n  the  
s t r e s s  t h a t  businessmen put upon taxes as  a f a c t o r  i n  determining 
('k) This research has been developed thanks t o  a fellowship from the  
Johns Hopkins University Metropolitan Planning and Research Center. 
Additional funding was received from t h e  Spanish I n s t i t u t e  of F i sca l  
S tudies .  Help i n  t h e  co l l ec t ion  of da ta  was provided by th.e Baltimore 




Some authors are more radical, and not only deny the influence of 
taxes, but also said that "is perhaps the most tested of all locational 
hypotheses. And thle results of prior testing do not encourage further 
test (3)" 
- The Survey Approach 
Surveys have probably been the most widespread method used to test 
the influence of taxes on location. A synthesis and evaluation of 
industrial location surveys was made by W. E. Morgan. He reviewed two 
dozen questionnaires and interview-location surveys coverin,g firms that 
located in approximately three-fifths of the states. He concluded: 
There is substanti-a1 agreement that nearness to markets, followed by 
labor, raw materials and transportation were the primary locational 
f ?  
determinants ... Almost invariably, taxes, along with financial 
inducements, were rated as an insignificant locational determinant ( 4 ) " .  
The above mentioned study should not give the impression that 
surveys always ranked taxes as an unimportant locational factor. Survey 
evidence in the role of taxes on location is inconclusive, with perhaps 
(1) Henry L. Hunker, Industrial development, Lexington, Mass., D . C .  
Heath and Co., 1974,, p . 1 3 6 .  
(2) Ibidem, op. cit. p.139. 
(3)  Leonard F. Wheat:, 
books, 1973, p.29 
Regional Growth and - Industrial Locat ion, lexirigton 
( 4 )  William E. Morgan, Taxes and the Location . -  of Industry, University of 
Colorado Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1967 
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a majority of cases i n  which taxes ranked r e l a t i v e l y  low, but with some 
surveys i n  which taxes rank r e l a t i v e l y  high. But whenever taxes rank 
high i n  a survey, t h e  r e s u l t  is not generally taken se r ious ly  by 
academics on t h e  grounds t h a t  t he re  a r e  "perverse incentives t o  - 
o v e r s t a t e  t h e  importance of taxes i n  surveys read by s t a t e  and loca l  
p o l i t i c i a n s  (5)". 
The same kind of argument i s  made aga ins t  t h e  dec lara t ions  of 
businessmen. For example, Harvey E .  Brazer c i t e d  t h e  following statement 
11 made i n  1957 by t h e  President of General Motors Corporation: t h e  l eve l  
of business taxa t ion  i n  Michigan already has led us t o  1oc.ate i n  o ther  
s t a t e s  where the  taxes f o r  General Motors job a r e  l e s s  than one-half of 
t h e  present  taxes per job i n  Michigan. This w i l l  a l s o  be taken i n t o  
consideration in  th . e  placement of addi t iona l  f a c i l i t i e s  (6)".  And a f t e r  
c r i t i c i z i n g  the  design of a survey t h a t  reached t h e  same conclusion, he 
sa id :  "In general ,  then, we f ind  a sharp cleavage between those who have 
attempted t o  study the  influence of taxes on loca t ion  and t h e  frequently 
expressed views of businessmen. Among the  reasons f o r  t h e  l a t t e r ' s  views 
we may f ind  the  f,act t h a t  s t a t e - l o c a l  taxes a r e  highly v i s i b l e  and, 
I 
unl ike  power, labo:r, mater ia l  and t r anspor t a t ion  c o s t s ,  a l l  of which 
genera l ly  bulk l a r g e r ,  they a r e  regarded as being subjec t  t o  cont ro l .  
No amount of r h e t o r i c  or invec t ive  is l i k e l y  t o  influence o ther  cos t ,  
but taxes  a r e  the  product of l e g i s l a t i v e  dec is ion  and a r e  subjec t  t o  
(5) Council of S t a t e  Planning Agencies, Theory and P rac t i ce  i n  t h e  
Desing - of Developmeint --- Finance Innovations, Washington, D.C., 1978,  p.30 
----- 
(6)  Harvey E .  Brazer, "Taxation and I n d u s t r i a l  Location i n  M:ichigan", i n  
William Haber e d . ,  The Michigan Economy, I t s  po ten t i a l s  and I ts  
Problems, The W .  E. Upjohn i n s t i t u t e  f o r  EmployGt  kesearch, Kalamazoo, 
Michigan, 1959.  
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being inf luenced by pressure  groups,  including business  ( 7 ) " .  
In  any case  it has t o  be s a i d  t h a t  what ever  t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  
survey a r e ,  they  are not  very r e l i a b l e .  Some of t h e  criticisms t h a t  can 
be made of t h a t  methodology a r e :  
I a) The samples inc lude  only those  firms t h a t  d i d  l o c a t e  i n  t h e  a rea  
under cons idera t ion .  For example, i f  you made t h e  survey on an a rea  
of h igh  t axes ,  it is  obvious t h a t  you can expect t h a t  no business  
w i l l  answer t h a t  t axes  has been an important l o c a t i o n a l  f a c t o r ,  
because i n  t h a t  case  it would never have loca ted  t h e r e  i n  t h e  f i r s t  
p l ace .  
b )  Most of the. t imes surveys f a i l  t o  make t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
t h e  loca t iona l  problems of s e l e c t i n g  a region and s e l e c t i n g  a p l a n t  
s i t e .  I t  has been pointed out  t h a t  f a c t o r s  taken i n t o  account i n  
s e l e c t i n g  a genera l  region a r e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  d i f fe ren t :  from those  
considered i n  s i t e  s e l e c t i o n .  
c) The surveys '  r e s u l t s  a r e  based on o r d i n a l  rankings of loose ly  
def ined  f a c t o r s .  The use of t h a t  s c a l e  of measurement implies t h a t  
L t h e  magnitude of t h e  e f f e c t  of each v a r i a b l e  on loca t ion  is  
determined only i n  a very genera l  way. 
d )  The samples are not  u sua l ly  r ep resen ta t ive  of t h e  populat ions.  
This i s  because t h e  sample s e l e c t i o n  is  no t  u sua l ly  done i n  a 
s c i e n t i f i c  way and t h e  propor t ions  of non-respondents i s  usua l ly  
very  high.  
.---_.-e------------ 
(7) I b i d .  p .  324 
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e) In many cases they try to measure the effect of taxes on the 
very heterogeneous population of business, without weighting for 
the relative importance of each industry category in bath number of 
establishments and number of employees, without reporting 
separately for each business category (Le. retail or 
manufacturing, food processing or consumer goods, etc) and without 
differentiating between relevant characteristics of the firm (i.e. 
large or small, capital or labor intensive, public or private 
ownership, etc). 
f) They usua1l.y give the result by number of establishments that 
have cited a locational factor as important, without specifiying 
the number of employees that those establishments represent. For 
example, in the survey by Eiuller and Norgan (8), large firms cited 
fiscal inducement as the main reason for their choices, but because 
they represent a very small proportion of total establishments, the 
researchers conclude that taxes are an unimportant locational 
factor. 
But, as (1. Armington has pointed out, criticizing the 
sentimental image of American capitalism of communities in which 
most people are employed in small independent business, "It is true 
that three-quarters of the business establishments in the country 
are independent businesses with a single location. Furthermore, 87% 
of all business establishments are small (belonging to firms with 
fewer than 100 employees). However, it is apparent from table 3 
(8) E. Muller and 3 .  N. Elorgan, "Locatisnal Decisions of Pianiifacturers", 
American Eccnomic -- R e v i e w ,  1962, p p . 2 0 4 - 2 1 7 .  
t L 
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that in 1976 the majority of United States private sector 
employment is in large multi-establishment firms (9)". The 
mentioned table gives the following percentage of employment by 
firm size and complexity: 28.7:; small (less than 100 employees) 
single location firms; 7:; small multi-establishment firms; 11.1% 
, large (over IO0 employees) single location firms; 53.2% large 
multi-establishment firms. 
g) For large firms and old firms it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to interview persons that where involved in all the 
s teps  of t h e  decision making process of locational selection. The 
persons completing the questionaire may give the highest ranking t o  
factors that they bGlieve should be important rather than the 
factors that actually motivated the location decision. 
h) Firms may use surveys to lobby for lower tax rates or tax 
exempt ions. 
I 
- The Statistical 
There have 
behavior of bus 
-- and Data Analysis Approach 
also been empirical studies that try to analyze the 
nesses by what they actually ~3 instead of what they say 
they do. A s  in the case of surveys, the results of those studies can 
also be taken, in the best of cases, only as suggestive. Some of the 
criticisms that can be made are: 
( 9 )  Catherine Armington "Further Examinations of Sources of Recent 
Employment Growth. Analysis  of USSEM Data f o r  1376 to 1980", Business 
Microdata Project,  The Brookings Institution, March 1983. 
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a) The d e f i n i t i o n  of each v a r i a b l e  is  o f t e n  made very loose ly ,  and 
it does not  measure what it is supposed t o .  This l i m i t a t i o n  is 
w e l l  known by many scho la r s .  For example, C .  Armingtcln, C .  Ha r r i s  
and M.  Odle s a i d  r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e i r  work: "The v a r i a b l e s  used for 
t h e  socioeconomic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  metropol i tan a reas  a r e  
o f t e n  averages f o r  broad c l a s s e s .  For example, t h e  cax index is 
ca l cu la t ed  from a composite of a l l  s t a t e  and loca l  t axes  pe r  
c a p i t a .  I t . i s  not a p r e c i s e  measure of t h e  a c t u a l  t a x  burden faced 
by a new bus iness  and does not  e x p l i c i t l y  t ake  i n t o  cons idera t ion  
any s p e c i a l  bene f i t s  o f f e red  by l o c a l  governments t o  induce 
businesses  t o  l o c a t e  t h e r e .  The wage v a r i a b l e  i s  a l s o  an average 
f o r  a l l  manufacturing production workers, which may not  accu ra t e ly  
& 
r e f l e c t  in te r -met ropol i tan  d i f f e rences  f o r  high technology 
i n d u s t r i e s .  As more d e t a i l e d  d a t a  becomes ava ib l e ,  f u r t h e r  research  
may c l a r i f y  many of t hese  ambigui t ies  ( l o ) " .  
b) There i s  a lack  of r e l i a b l e  d a t a  f o r  many v a r i a b l e s .  A t  t h i s  
po in t  t h e r e  is no complete and e labora ted  d a t a  base f o r  measuring 
t h e  behavior of bus iness ,  al though some s t e p s  a r e  being taken i n  
t h e  U.S. t o  f i l l  t h a t  void wi th  t h e  development of t h e  United 
L 
S t a t e s  Establishment and En te rp r i se  Nicrodata (11). The problems 
wi th  t h e  use  of  t h e  Dunn's and Brads t ree t  Narkets I d e n t i f i e r s ,  
which is probably t h e  most widely used da ta  base un t i . l  now, have 
(10) C .  Armington, C. Har r i s  and bl. Odle, "Formation and Growth i n  High 
Technology Business : A R.egiona1 Assessment", Business Microdata 
P r o j e c t ,  Washington,,D.C., The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n ,  1983. 
(11) Candee S .  H a r r i s ,  "United S t a t e s  Establishment and En te rp r i se  
Microdata", t h e  Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n ,  Apr i l  1983 
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been expla in  by Struyk ( 1 2 ) .  An exce l l en t  review of t h e  major i ty  
of d a t a  bases ava ib l e  has been done by R ,  E .  Berney (13) .  
c) The design of t h e  s t u d i e s  a r e  o f t e n  done i n  a n o n - s c i e n t i f i c  
way, with many i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  i ncons i s t enc ie s .  That 
criticism should be done research  by research ,  and t h a t  t a s k  is  out  
of  t h e  scope of t h i s  work. An a n a l y s i s  of a l l  t h e  econometric 
models can be found i n  Wasylenko ( 1 4 ) ,  which is  t h e  l a t e s t  
l i t e r a t u r e  review t h a t  I am aware of (15) .  A d e t a i l e d  criticism of 
t h e  " I n t e r s t a t e  Tax Competition" s tudy  of A C I R  (16) ,  which is  t h e  
most r ecen t  arid comprehensive a n a l y s i s  of l oca t iona l  d a t a ,  can be 
found i n  Mo1in.i ( 1 7 ) .  
d )  The use of s t a t i s t i c a l  methods, which is  t h e  most accura te  way 
of measuring t h e  relevance of a l o c a t i o n a l  f a c t o r ,  does not  r e a l l y  
prove anything. I f  t h e  tes t  i s  well done and has not  been 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
(12) Raymond J. Struyk,  Intrarnetropol i tan I n d u s t r i a l  Location, D .  C .  
Heath and Company, 1975, pp. 151-157 I 
(13) Robert E .  Berney, 11 Developing a Plicrodata Base t o  Support Research 
on Small Business I s sues t t ,  Review of Publ ic  Data Use, 1982, pp. 167-178. -- 
(14) Michael Wasylenko, "The Location of Firms, The Role of Taxes and 
F i s c a l  Incent ives" ,  i n  Roy Bahl Ed.,  Urban Government -- Finance 9 Emerging 
Trends, Sage Publ ica t ions ,  Beverly H i l l s ,  London, 1981, 
(15) For e a r l i e r  l i t e r a t u r e  reviews see: John F. Due, "Studi.es of S t a t e -  
Local Tax Inf luences on Location of Industry" ,  Nat ional  'Tax Journa l ,  
1961, pp. 163-173, and Joe S .  Floyd, E f f e c t s  of Taxation o I n d u s t r i a 1  
Location, Chapel H i l l ,  North Caro l ina ,  Univers i ty  of North Carol ina 
Press ,  1952. 
(16) A C I R ,  -_I__- I n t e r s t a t e  Tax Competition, Washington, D.C., Government 
P r i n t i n g  Off ice ,  1981,  
( 1 7 )  Fernando Molini,  Ensayos - de -- un Geografo -- sobre - e l-- Federalism0 - F i s c a l  
---- de L O ~  EE.UU., Fundacion Juan !!arch, Madrid, 1984. 
c 
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manipulated to obtain the desired result, in the best of cases, it 
will suggest that something happened and it will yield the level of 
probability that the result is Rot due to chance. One of the 
problems with the reward system of academic work is that in most of 
the cases, in order to be published, the results should be 
statistically significant and not empirically different from what 
it is common1:y believed, unless you can really prove the accuracy 
of your results. This gives an incentive to use alternative ways 
of measuring the same variables and alternative statistical methods 
until the expected results are obtained. 
I 
The imperfections of the empirical studies are recognized by 
many scholars;, although I have never seen a comprehensive 
compilation of defects. This may give the impresion that they are 
not important enough as to question the results of the studies. 
For example, Ililler E. Willard said: "Although many studies have 
been made of the effects of taxes on the location of industry, they 
have rarely been sufficiently sophisticated in their techniques to 
be of great value ... Most studies of the influence of taxes on 
industrial location have a number of weaknesses. For example, they 
do not answer a basic question: If the tax structure had been 
different, would manufactural growth have been at an even higher 
level? They also ignore the influence of,different types of taxes. 
Nevertheless, they do reveal that higher taxes have not had a 
4 
measurable effect on the growth of manufacturing in a particular 
locality (18)". As a mare recent example, Roger W. Schmenner said: 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
(18) E. Willard Miller, Manufacturing: - A Study - of Industrial - Location, 
c 
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Statistical tests of the effects of taxes have never been as 
precise as both proponents and critics would like. While I cannot 
pretend that my own data about tax and financial effects on 
industrial development are thoroughly persuasive and definitive, 
they do add weight to the general view that taxation and financing 




se1ecti.on of new plant locations (19)". 
- Case -_ of Intrametropolitan Location 
In spite of the general opinion among academics of the lack of 
influence of taxes, many scholars have expressed some doubts of 
intrametropolitan :location. For example, ACIR said : "The Commission 
recognizes that, within a region -and particularly between states in the 
same metropolitan area- interstate tax differentials can. become the 
'swing' factor in industrial location decisions (20)" 
The empirical studies of Wasylenko (21) and Fox (22 )  seems to 
t 
colloborate the statement of ACIR for intrametropolitan firm relocation. 
Wasylenko found that, after omitting jurisdictions appearing to zone out 
University Park, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1977, pp. 127-128. 
(19) Roger W. Schmenner, Making Business Location Decisions, Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982, p.45 
(20) ACIR, op. cit.,s p.4 
(21) M. J. Wasylenkc, "Evidence o f  fiscal differentials and 
intrametropolitan firm relocation", Land Economics, 1980, pp. 339-349 
(22) W. Fox, "Fiscal differentials and industrial location: some 
empirical evidence", cited by Wasylenko, op. cit., p. 339 
i n d u s t r i a l  
ind ica ted  
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or  commercials firms, the  r e s u l t  of h i s  econometric ana lys i s  
t h a t  f i s c a l  var iab les  were s t a s t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  
determinants f o r  loca t ion  of manufacturing and wholesale t r ade .  But 
Wasylenko's r e s u l t s  ind ica ted  t h a t  t ax  var iab les  were less important 
p red ic to r s  of establishment location than labor supply and agglomeration 
economies t h a t  were a l s o  s i g n i f i c a n t  f o r  t he  above mentioned indus t r i e s  
p lus  cons t ruc t ion ,  r e t a i l ,  finance and se rv ice  firms,. He concluded t h a t  
manufacturing and wholesale t r ade  were more s e n s i t i v e  t o  taxes because 
they a r e  more concerned with cos t ,  while t h e  o ther  i ndus t r i e s  may follow 
consumer markets arid p lace  l e s s  emphasis on f i s c a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  
One more time, h i s  methodology of ana lys i s  should be questioned. H i s  
evidence on t h e  influence of taxes on manufactuturing and wholesale is  
suggestive,  but not conclusive. This,  p lus  t h e  weight of t h e  opinion of 
most of t h e  scholars ,  may be what made Wasylenko t o  be very ca re fu l  i n  
h i s  conclusions about t h e  influence of taxes on loca t ion .  In  h i s  above 
mentioned l i t e r a t u r e  review, WasyleRko concluded: "Taxes and f i s c a l  
incent ives  play l i t t l e  o r  no r o l e  i n  a f i rm ' s  choice of loca t ion  among 
reg ions . .  .The in t r a reg iona l  evidence on t h e  e f f e c t  of taxes  i s  l e s s  
d e f i n i t i v e .  When firm loca t iona l  model's t ake  account of a community's 
supply of i n d u s t r i a l  s i t e s ,  taxes a r e  a s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  
determinant of i n d u s t r i a l  loca t ions .  S t i l l ,  t axes  a r e  secondarily 
important f o r  loca t  ional decisions (23)".  
6 
(23) Wasylenko, "The Location of F i rms ,  t h e  Role of Taxes and F i s c a l  
Incentives", op. cit:., p.  186 
13 
Criticism of the Effectiveness of the Enterprise Zone Policies -- --- 
The belief that taxes are not very influential on business location 
has been taken in consideration in the design of some public pclicies. 
For example, it explains in part why fiscal incentives are accompanied 
in the Enterprise Zone policies by other incentives, especially in the 
original proposals. In Great Britain the fiscal incentives consist in 
the exemption from development land tax and local rates and the 
possibility to write off 1007L of capital expenditures for tax purposes. 
But the Enterprise Zone also waives the need to obtain planning 
permission from the local authority, building regulations are 
streamlined, and accountability reports are reduced ( 2 4 ) .  The 
deregulation incentives are also being included in the different 
proposal discussed in the U . S .  at the federal level as well as in the 
Enterprise Zone policies discussed (and many of them already approved) 
in several states. 
A l s o ,  the opinilon that taxes are not very influential on business 
location is used as one of the main arguments against the potential 
effectiveness of such policies. For example, Robert Mier and Scott E. 
Gelzer said: " the advantages of comprehensive state tax relief are 
somewhat elusive. State tax liability constitutes only a small fraction 
of an individual company's operating cost, and has repeatedly been shown 
to be a minor factor in influencing location and expansiari decisions 
(25) " 
( 2 4 )  Robert A .  Beauregard and Briavel Holcomb, "Enterprise Zones : the 
Non-Manipulation of Economic Space", Urban Geography, pp. 223-243.  
(25) Robert E. Plier and Scott E. Gelzer, "State Enterprise Zones: The 
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1I:REFUTING THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EFFECTS OF TAX 
DIFFERENTIALS 
Probably t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  arguments aga ins t  t he  e f f e c t s  of taxes on 
loca t ion  have been more i n f l u e n t i a l  i n  t he  general  perception of t h e  
i s sue  among scholars than t h e  empirical s tud ie s  discussed above. I even 
have t h e  impression t h a t  t h e  design and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of r e s u l t s  of 
many s tud ie s  have been biased fo r  t he  t h e o r e t i c a l  reasons t h a t  were 
believed t o  explain t h e  l i t t l e  e f f e c t s  of taxes on loca t ion .  
This chapter is  dedicated t o  demonstrate t h a t  i n  many cases those 
t h e o r e t i c a l  arguments a r e  wrong. 
1.- Taxes as  a Payment i n  Lieu of Services:  -- ----
What may be moxe important f o r  business i s  t h e  q u a l i t y  of se rv ices  
provided r e l a t i v e  to t a x  burden. From t h i s  statement it has very o f t en  
been considered th.at higher taxes and t ax  r a t e s  do not necessar i ly  
d e t r a c t  from an indus t ry ' s  evaluation of a s i z e  because they may be 
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assoc ia ted  with more publ ic  s e rv i ces .  Lower taxes can mean lower 
a v a i l a b i l i t y  and q u a l i t y  of publ ic  s e rv i ces ,  while higher taxes can mean 
g rea t e r  a v a i l a b i l i t y  and q u a l i t y  of s e rv i ces .  If t h i s  i s  t r u e ,  t a x  
va r i a t ions  cannot be considered an added cos t  t o  t h e  firm. 
New Front ie r?" ,  -- Urban a f f a i r s  quarterly, Sage Publ ica t ions ,  London, 
1982, p . - - ,  
This  argument has been enough 
of i n d u s t r i a l  l oca t ion .  However, 
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t o  not  cons ider  taxes  i n  many a n a l y s i s  
t h i s  a s soc ia t ion  of h igher  t axes  with 
h igher  q u a l i t y  of se rv i ces  is  not  o f t e n  found i n  r e a l i t y  and can not  be 
taken s e r i o u s l y .  This i s  f o r  t h r e e  reasons:  
a) The main source of revenues f o r  any government :Level i s  not  
l i k e l y  t o  come from taxes  lev ied  on bus iness .  Therefore ,  it may be 
f requent  t o  f i n d  s t a t e s  and/or l o c a l  governments with comparatively 
l o w  t axes  on bus iness ,  but  wi th  higher  t axes  as measured i n  a more 
genera l  way, such a s  t axes  per  c a p i t a .  
This  i s  t h e  case  i n  my a n a l y s i s  f o r  t h e  Baltimore-Washington 
area between 1974-1979. In  terms of t a x  e f f o r t  (26) ,  " 'Fiscal blood 
pressure"  (27), and per  c a p i t a  t a x  revenue, Maryland d id  have hkgher 
t a x  p re s su re  than Vi rg in i a .  However, when t a x  burden was measured i n  
terms of taxesl on several hypothe t ica l  manufacturings,  f o r  t h e  
ma jo r i ty  of them (and p a r t i c u l a r l y  for  t h e  c a p i t a l  i n t ens ive  f i rms) ,  
t h e  Maryland j u r i s d i c t i o n s  d i d  have lower t a x  burden on 
manufacturing than t h e  Virg in ia  j u r i s d i c t i o n s .  The lower t a x  burden 
on manufacturing f o r  most cases  i n  Maryland was explained,  i n  p a r t ,  
by t h e  exempti.on of manufacturing equipment from t h e  personal  
proper ty  t a x .  T:he research  shows t h a t  most of t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  of 
t h e  s t a t e  wi th  t h e  lower taxes  on manufacturing d i d  have more 
revenues,  which w i l l  provide them wi th  h igher  q u a l i t y  of s e r v i c e s .  
(26)  As def ined  i n  A C I R ,  Tax Capacity of t h e  F i f t y  S t a t e s :  Piethodolo 
- and Es t imates ,  Government P r i n t i n g  Of f i ce ,  Washington, D.C., 1982, a% 
i n  A C I R ,  1981 Tax Capacity of t h e  F i f t y  S t a t e s ,  Government P r i n t i n g  
Of f i ce ,  Washington, D . C . ,  1983. 
- -
-- - -
(27)  I b i d .  
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b) The l eve l  of revenues does not depend on the  t ax  r a t e s  alone, but 
a l s o  on t h e  economic base on which those r a t e s  a r e  applied and on 
who bears t h e  t a x  burden. 
The ACIR r epor t s  on t a x  capacity mentioned above a r e  very 
i l l u s t r a t i v e  ablout t h i s  i s sue .  For example, according t o  t h e  r epor t ,  
Alaska i n  1981 has the  highest  s t a t e  t a x  e f f o r t ,  84% above t h e  t h e  
na t iona l  average. But, Alaska's t a x  e f f o r t  is  la rge ly  a t t r i b u t a b l e  
t o  i t s  exceptionally high severance t a x  co l l ec t ions ,  and does not 
i nd ica t e  t h a t  i t s  res idents  and businesses a r e  generally subjec t  t o  
heavy t a x  burdens. Indeed, i t s  non-severance t ax  e f f o r t  is  38% below 
of the  na t iona l  average. 
ACIR a l s o  pointed out t h a t  many western s t a t e s  have ra i sed  
average o r  above average revenues with low t ax  e f f o r t .  And, on the  
o ther  hand, t h e  revenues of many o ther  s t a t e s ,  such as  those i n  the  
Northeast, might have revenues remaining i n  l i n e  with the  na t iona l  
average, even i f  they have r i s i n g  t a x  e f f o r t s ,  simply blecause t h e i r  
capac i t i e s  have declined i n  t h e  meantime. 
c) As Richard IB. Mackenzie has pointed out ,  "a growing volume of 
l i t e r a t u r e  i n  publ ic  choice economics reveals a tendency towards 
diseconomies of s c a l e  i n  government a t  a l l  l eve ls :  with growth i n  
t a x  c o l l e c t i o n s ,  t h e  quant i ty  and q u a l i t y  of public s e rv i ces  do not 
r i s e  proportionately (28) 'I. 
(28)  Richard B .  MacKenzie, Res t r i c t ions  on Business Mobility, American 
Enterpr i se  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Public Policy Research, Washington, D . C . ,  1 9 7 9 ,  
p . 4 8  
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Those th ree  arguments a r e  enough t o  conclude t h a t  a t  l e a s t  i n  many 
cases it is not a va l id  assumption t h a t  higher taxes correspond with 
higher q u a l i t y  of se rv ices  and v ice  versa .  
2. -  The Mitigating Influence of t he  Federal Deduct ib i l i ty  ---
I t  has been argued t h a t  any given s t a t e  and loca l  t ax  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
i n  t h e  U.S. w i l l  be reduced by approximately 50% due t o  the  
d e d u c t i b i l i t y  of st:ate and loca l  taxes f o r  federa l  income t a x  purposes. 
This argument has lbeen expresed by A C I R  i n  t he  following way: "Federal 
and s t a t e  income t a x  provisions t h a t  permit business t o  write-off s t a t e  
and loca l  taxes diminish the  importance of any t ax  l i a b i l i t y  
d i f f e rences .  One olf t he  l e a s t  publicized e f f e c t s  of cur ren t  federa l  
po l icy  i s  t h e  mi t iga t ing  influence of t h e  f ede ra l  income t a x  on the  
inev i t ab le  d i f fe rences  i n  s t a t e  and loca l  t a x  r a t e s .  I n  income t ax  
s t a t e s ,  s t a t e s '  t a x  provisions perform a s imi l a r  but quan t i t a t ive ly  
smaller r o l e  with respect t o  loca l  t ax  d i f fe rences  ( 2 9 ) . "  
I 
The above argument i s  only p a r t i a l l y  t r u e .  I t  is t r u e  only i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  absolute aspect of t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l s ,  but not t o  what I 
have ca l l ed  the  proportional aspect of t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l s ,  t h a t  i s ,  t he  
r e l a t ionsh ip  of t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  t o  p r o f i t s  a f t e r  taxes .  For example, 
it is t r u e  t h a t  i f  a business paid i n  loca t ion  A $100,000 more than i n  B 
before federa l  income t ax ,  it w i l l  pay only around $50,000 more i n  A 
than i n  B a f t e r  federa l  income t ax .  However, i n  proportion t o  p r o f i t s  
a f t e r  t he  federa l  income t a x ,  t h e  t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l  i s  unchanged. Let me 
-__-------------..--- 
(29)  A C I R ,  I n t e r s t a t e  - -  Tax Competition, op. c i t . ,  p.6 
prove t h a t  statement. 
Suppose t h a t  we have a firm located i n  J u r i s d i c t i o n  A ,  which has 
r e l a t i v e l y  high s t a t e  and loca l  taxes .  In  t h i s  loca t ion ,  t he  corporation 
pays 6% of i t s  p r o f i t s  i n  s t a t e  and loca l  taxes .  In  j u r i s d i c t i o n  B ,  t h a t  
is r e l a t i v e l y  low i n  loca l  taxes ,  t he  corporation w i l l  pay 2% of i t s  
* p r o f i t s  i n  s t a t e  and loca l  taxes .  
I 
The p r o f i t s  t h a t  t h e  corporation w i l l  have i n  A a f t e r  having paid 
s ta te  and loca l  ta.xes a re :  I T - 0 . 0 6 ~ 0 .  94n ,  where IT represents prof i t s  
i n  A and B before any t a x  (it is  assumed t h a t  t h e  revenues and a l l  cos t s  
except taxes a r e  equal i n  A and B ) .  If t h e  corporation were located i n  
B ,  p r o f i t s  a f t e r  s t a t e  and loca l  taxes would be: 1 ~ - 0 . 0 2 1 ~ = 0 . 9 8 1 ~ .  The t a x  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  i s  0 . 9 8 1 ~ - 0 . 9 4 1 ~ = 0 . 0 4 ~ .  I f t h e  business moves t o  B it w i l l  
increase  i t s  bene f i t s  a f t e r  s t a t e  and loca l  taxes by 0 .047 ,  t h a t  i s ,  an 
increase  by 4.26% i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  p r o f i t s  i n  A a f t e r  s t a t e  and loca l  
taxes  ( 0 . 9 4 7 ) .  
If  w e  assume i9 f l a t  federa l  income t a x  of 45%, we g e t :  In  A 
0 . 9 4 ~ - 0 . 4 2 3 ~ 0 . 5 1 7 1 ~  and i n  B 0 .981~-0 .4411~=0 .5391~ .  The t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
will be of 0.0227, about ha l f  t h a t  before t h e  federa l  income t ax .  But i n  
‘ r e l a t i o n  t o  the  remainding p r o f i t s  i n  A a f t e r  a l l  taxes ( : 0 . 5 1 7 1 ~ ) ,  t h e  
a 
t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l  i s  exac t ly  t h e  same as  before,  4.26%. 
O f  course, i f  t h e  f ede ra l  d e d u c t i b i l i t y  d id  not e x i s t ,  t h e  t a x  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  p r o f i t s  would have been even higher.  In  t h i s  
las t  sense, it is poss ib le  t o  speak about t h e  mi t iga t ing  influence of 
t h e  federa l  d e d u c t i b i l i t y .  But t h a t  mi t iga t ing  influence does not 
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diminish the  importance, i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  p r o f i t s ,  of any t a x  l i a b i l i t y  
d i f f e rence .  
Taxes can be Shi f ted  3 , -  ---~ 
Since we have been discussing t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l s ,  it can be assumed 
t h a t  f o r  firms s e l l i n g  s imi l a r  products i n  the  same markets, one can 
s ta te  t h a t  it wou1.d not be competitive fo r  t h e  firm i n  the  higher t a x  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  t o  s h i f t  i t s  t ax  load d i f f e r e n t i a l  v i a  p r i c e  change. D .  M .  
Soule argues about t h a t  as  follows: "A d i f f e r e n t i a l  i n  t o t a l  t a x  load 
is of t h e  na ture  of a p a r t i a l  t a x  ( i . e . ,  a t a x  appl icable  a t  d i f f e r e n t  
r a t e s  o r  only t o  p a r t  of t he  firms s e l l i n g  i n  a market). In  incidence 
ana lys i s ,  t he  e f f e c t  of a p a r t i a l  t ax  is  t o  cause long run migration of 
productive resources t o  other (lower t ax )  a reas .  This long run 
migration of productive resources caused by t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  between 
s t a t e s  c o n s t i t u t e s  t he  bas i s  f o r  t h e  contention t h a t  i n t e r s t a t e  t a x  
d i f f e r e n t i a l s  may a f f e c t  i n d u s t r i a l  loca t ion .  Measurement of t hese  t ax  
d i f f e r e n t i a l s  requi res  t h a t  t a x  loads be computed i n  terms of t o t a l  
d o l l a r s  of taxes pa.id t o  government, without d i s t i ngu i sh ing  t h e  types of 
' t a x e s  composing the  t o t a l  t a x  load, and with adjustment only f o r  obvious 
cases of s h i f t i n g  (30)". 
To be ab le  t o  s h i f t  t h e  t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l  v i a  p r i c e  change due t o  
loca l  monopoly, does not mean t h e  d i f fe rences  i n  t ax  burden w i l l  not 
in f luence  business loca t ion .  That w i l l  only happen, i f  we assume p r o f i t  
.- 
(30) Don M .  Soule Comparative Total  - -- I___ 
Corporations, Lexington, Kentucky, 
26-27. 
Tax ---- Loads - of Selected Manufacturin 
University of Kentucky, 1960, pp! 
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maximization firms, i n  cases where the  business can only s h i f t  t h e  taxes  
i n  only one of t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  loca t ions .  If t h e  business can s h i f t  t h e  
taxes i n  both p laces ,  it w i l l  p r e f e r ,  o ther  th ings  being equal,  t h e  
lower t ax  j u r i s d i c t i o n ,  s ince  a l l  t h e  taxes t h a t  t h e  business i s  
s h i f t i n g  a r e  i n  f a c t  po ten t i a l  p r o f i t s  t h a t  t h e  business could make i f  
t he re  were no taxes .  
I t  can be argued t h a t  t he  firms more l i k e l y  t o  be a f fec ted  by t a x  
And l a rge r  t h e  market, d i f f e r e n t i a l s  a r e  f i r m s  i n  a competitive market. 
the less l i k e l y  t h a t  t axes  could be s h i f t e d  v i a  p r i c e  changes. 
I t  must be admitted t h a t  some s h i f t i n g  of cos t  might occur by means 
o ther  than p r i c e  changes, e .g .  lower wages paid t o  workers. But f o r  
firms c lose  enough, s e l l i n g  s i m i l i a r  products i n  the  same market, 
comparative lower 'wages may cause the  workers t o  be l e s s  e f f i c i e n t  a t  
work. Furthermore, s t a t e s  with high taxes a r e  where unions tend t o  be 
stronger and where wages a r e  higher. Therefore, it is d i f f i c u l t  t o  s h i f t  
taxes t o  the  workers. 
4 . -  Tax D i f f e r e n t i a l s  Cons t i tu te  Only 2 Small Frac t ion  of 8 Company's 
Operating Cost 
--
The f i r s t  e r r o r  i n  t h a t  statement i s  t o  r e l a t e  t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  t o  
cost ins tead  of t o  p r o f i t s ,  a mistake very o f t en  made. Maxy empirical  
s tud ie s  have shown t h a t  i f  we r e l a t e  t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l  t o  p r o f i t s  t h e  
increase or decrease i n  p r o f i t s  due t o  t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  can become very 
s i g n i f i c a n t .  In  my study on t h e  Baltimore-Washington Area an extreme 
e 
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case  of a hypothe t ica l  corporat ion based on a r e a l  corpora t ion  shows an 
inc rease  i n  p r o f i t s  of nea r ly  30:k due t o  t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  i f  it loca te s  
i n  Anne Arundel County, Maryland ( t h e  lowest t a x  j u r i s d i c t i o n  f o r  t h a t  
firm) i n s t ead  of i n  Washington, D . C .  ( t h e  h ighes t  t a x  j u r i s d i c t i o n ) .  
For most of t h e  hypothe t ica l  corpora t ions  t h e  average was of around 10% 
increase  i n  p r o f i t s .  A review of o t h e r  s t u d i e s  shows a l a rge  s i z e  of 
geographical  t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  r e l a t i v e  t o  business  p r o f i t s  which can be 
found i n  Kenneth A .  Small (31) and Wasylenko ( 3 2 ) .  tlost of those  works 
use  t h e  t y p i c a l  manufacturing methodology. However, research  us ing  
aggregate  d a t a  on taxes  and business  have a l s o  shown t h a t  s t a t e  and 
l o c a l  t axes  have become s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  a business  income, 
and show a very wide v a r i a t i o n  across  s t a t e s .  William C .  Wheathon i n  
one of such s t u d i e s  draws t h e  fol lowing conclusions:  " F i r s t ,  business  
t axes  c o n s t i t u t e  a l a r g e r  sha re  of ne t  business  income than previous ly  
thought ,  around 8 percent .  Second, and perhaps more impor tan t ly ,  t h i s  
sha re  e x h i b i t s  s i z a b l e  v a r i a t i o n s  across  s t a t e s ,  ranging from 3 t o  12 
pe rcen t .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  i s  a very d i s t i n c t  reg iona l  pat . tern t o  t h e  
t a x a t i o n  of bus inesses .  The South and t h e  Farm Bel t  ha.ve very low 
t a x a t i o n ,  followed by t h e  Mountain S t a t e s .  The Nid-West has average t a x  
levels ,  while  t h e  West Coast i s  above average. The Northeast  has t h e  
h ighes t  e f f e c t i v e  t a x  l e v e l s  on business  ( 3 3 ) " .  
(31) Kenneth A .  Small, Geographically D i f f e r e n t i a t e d  Taxes and t h e  
Location of Firms, Pr ince ton ,  New Je r sey ,  Pr inceton Urban and Regional 
Research Center ,  1952 
-- - -
(32 )  Michael Wasylenko, "The Location of Firms, The Role c:f Taxes and 
F i s c a l  Incent ives" ,  i n  Roy Bahl Ed., op. c i t .  
(33 )  William C .  Wheaten, " I n t e r s t a t e  Differences i n  thLe Level of 
Business Taxation", National Tax Journa l ,  1983, p .  84.  -
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The f a c t  t h a t  t ax  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  a r e  i n  many cases s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  p r o f i t s  has been reconci l ia ted  with t h e  general  view on the  
grounds t h a t  o ther  cos t  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  a r e  even g rea t e r  and f o r  t h e  o ther  
t h ree  t h e o r e t i c a l  considerations re fu ted  i n  t h i s  chapter.  
Against t h e  argument t h a t  o ther  cos t  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  a r e  g rea t e r  K .  A .  
Small s t a t e d :  "This argument ignores the  f a c t  t h a t  it is t h e  marginal 
e f f e c t  of taxes ,  a l l  o ther  f ac to r s  held constant,  t h a t  matters.  Any 
firm f o r  which loca t ion  is an i ssue  a t  a l l  must face  two o r  more 
poss ib le  s i t e s  with advantages and disadvantages t h a t  hover i n  a c lose  
balance; otherwise the  f i rm 's  executives would not waste t h e i r  time 
worrying about loca t iona l  choice. In such cases,  t a x  or  o ther  f inanc ia l  
inducements would s u b s t a n t i a l l y  a f f e c t  t he  comparison of expected p r o f i t  
l eve l s  a t  a l te rna t . ive  loca t ions .  The question then becomes: How many 
firms a r e  the re  f o r  which a given municipality i s  one of severa l  c lose ly  
competing loca t ions?  Most s t a t e  and municipal governments apparently 
be l ieve  t h e  answer i s :  Many ( 3 4 ) " .  
Here I w i l l  attempt t o  develop a method t h a t  w i l l  help, t o  measure 
t h e  r e l a t i v e  importance of two or  more cost  d i f f e r e n t i a l s .  The method 
consists i n  comparing t h e  increase  i n  p r o f i t s  of a t y p i c a l  business,  i f  
it moves o r  loca tes  i n  places with d i f f e r e n t  cos t s .  Because I w i l l  be 
using as a d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  hypothetical  corporation proportions 
between p r o f i t s ,  revenues and cos t ,  t he  r e s u l t s  a r e  appl icable  t o  
businesses t h a t  f i t  more o r  l e s s  t he  proportions,  whether it i s  a small 
or l a rge  business.  
- -" - - - - - - . - - - - - -L- - .  
( 3 4 )  K .  A .  Small, op. c i t . ,  p . 7 .  
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a )  increase i n  p r o f i t s  of a business i n  a high wages and high taxes 
j u r i s d i c t i o n  ( A )  t h a t  moves t o  a low wages j u r i s d i c t i o n  (B)  
The assumptions made i n  t h e  examples a re :  
-S ta te  and loca l  taxes before income t a x  are  2% of p r o f i t s  
before any t a x  i n  A .  
-Before t a x  p r o f i t s  a r e  2476 of t o t a l  revenue, which gives us a 
reasonable r a t e  of re turn  of invested c a p i t a l  a f t e r  a l l  taxes of 
around 12%, with va r i a t ions  depending on s t a t e  and loca l  t a x  
d i f f e r e n t i a l s .  Therefore, s t a t e  and loca l  taxes a r e  0.63% of a l l  
o ther  cos t s .  
-Labor cos t s  represent 25% of t o t a l  cos t s ,  therefore  19% of 
revenue o r  79.17% of before t ax  p r o f i t s .  In  t h e  examples, I 
w i l l  use a high proportion of labor t o  p r o f i t s  i n  comparision t o  
t h e  proportion of loca l  taxes o ther  than income t o  p r o f i t s .  T h i s  
is t o  avoid t h e  c r i t i c i s m  t h a t  t he  r e s u l t s  on the  impact of 
taxes d i f f e r e n t i a l s  has been obtained because of an excessive 
tax share  o:E p r o f i t s .  
-S ta te  income t a x  r a t e  i s  10% and t h e r e  is  a f l a t  f ede ra l  income 
tax of 45%. 
I 
P r o f i t s  i n  A a r e :  
7 t l = 7 t - O .  0 2 ~ = 0 . 9 8 ~ ;  
7t2=0.98~-0.098~~0.882~; 
~3=0 .882~-0 .3969~=0 .485  IT. 
Where T=profits  before any t ax ;  Tl=prof i t s  a f t e r  s t a t e  and loca l  
taxes o ther  than income; .rrZ=profits a f t e r  s t a t e  income tax; 
~ 3 = p r o f i t s  a f t e r  federa l  income tax .  
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After t h e  move t o  a j u r i s d i c t i o n  with a 20% lower labor cos t  t h e  
p r o f i t s ,  a l l  o ther  th ings  being equal,  w i l l  be: 
~1=0.98~+0.158341~=1.13834n; 
n2=1 .024506~ ;  
n 3 = 0 . 5 6 3 4 7 8 3 ~  
The increase i n  p r o f i t s  a f t e r  t h e  move w i l l  be 0.07837837.  In 
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  p r o f i t s  before the  move, t h e  labor cost: d i f f e r e n t i a l  
represents  a 16.157% increase .  
Labor cos ts  have been taken as  an example. Obviously, any o ther  
f a c t o r  could have been used ins tead  of labor,  and the  r e s u l t s  would 
have remained unchanged as  long as  t h e  proportions were maintained. 
Another way of i n t e r p r e t i n g  each example is  a reduction of a l l  
costs other  tha.n taxes between a l t e r n a t i v e  loca t ions .  This i s  tak ing  
i n t o  account t h e  increase and decrease i n  cos t .  For example, t h e  
r e s u l t s  of t h e  above case can be in t e rp re t ed  a s  a increase i n  
p r o f i t s  i n  a loca t ion  where t h e  balance between savings i n  cos t  and 
extra cost r e s u l t  i n  a 5% reduction i n  t o t a l  cos t .  
b) Increase i n  p r o f i t s  of a business i n  a high wages and high t a x  
I 
j u r i s d i c t i o n  ( A )  t h a t  moves t o  a low t a x  j u r i s d i c t i o n  (:C) 
Assume t h a t  our business i n  j u r i s d i c t i o n  A moves t o  a 
j u r i s d i c t i o n  with ha l f  t h e  loca l  taxes  of A and no income t a x  (35).  
(35) There a re  four S t a t e s  without income tax: Nevada, Texas, Washington 
and Wyoming, and South Dakota has a very small s t a t e  income t a x .  
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0 . 0 5 4 4 5 ~ ,  or  a 12.2448% increase  The increase i n  p r o f i t s  would be 
i n  p r o f i t s .  This is a very s i g n i f i c a n t  increase ,  even i.f it is lower 
than the  one due t o  labor cos t  d i f f e r e n t i a l s .  
c) Increase i n  p r o f i t s  of a business i n  a high wage and t a x  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  ( A )  t h a t  moves t o  a low t a x  and r e l a t i v e l y  low wage 
j u r i s d i c t i o n  (I)) : 
Assume t h a t  our business i n  j u r i s d i c t i o n  A moves t o  a 
j u r i s d i c t i o n  with a 10% lower labor c o s t ,  half  t he  loca l  taxes of A 
and no income t ax .  A l l  o ther  th ings  being equal, t h e  p r o f i t s  i n  D 
w i l l  be: 
nl= 0.997 + 0 . 0 7 9 1 7 ~ =  1 . 0 6 9 1 7 ~ ;  
n3= 0 . 5 8 8 0 4 ~ .  
The increase i n  p r o f i t s  a f t e r  t h e  move i s  0 . 1 0 2 9 4 3 5 ~ ,  a 
increase of 21.22%. 
I 
In  t h i s  example, t h e  lower labor cos t  i n  C than i n  D i s  not 
enough t o  o f f s e t  lower taxes of D.  
d )  Increase i n  p r o f i t s  of a business i n  a high wage and high t a x  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  (A:) t h a t  moves t o  a very low wage j u r i s d i c t i o n :  
Assume t h a t  our business moves t o  Hong Kong, where labor cos t  is 
approximately 80% cheaper ( 3 6 ) .  Assuming a l l  o ther  things a r e  equal 
( 3 6 )  Richard Peet provided t h e  da t a  t h a t  i n  1978 t he  hourly earnings i n  
manufacturing were of $0 .78  i n  Hong Kong and of $6.17  i n  t h e  U.S. i n  h i s  
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(37), t h e  inc rease  i n  p r o f i t s  w i l l  be: 
sl= 0 . 9 8 7  + 0 . 6 3 3 3 6 ~  1 .613361~;  
s2= 1 . 4 5 2 0 2 4 ~ ;  
s3= 0 .79861327.  
The i nc rease  i n  p r o f i t s  is of 64.627; 
e )  Increase  i n  p r o f i t s  of a business  i n  a high wage and high t a x  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  t h a t  moves t o  a very low t a x  j u r i s d i c t i o n :  
Assume t h a t  our bus iness  i n  A moves t o  a j u r i s d i c t i o n  t h a t  has ,  
us ing  again t h e  Hong Kong example, a s i n g l e  15% income t a x .  s3 
will be 0 . 8 5 ~ .  The inc rease  i n  p r o f i t s  w i l l  be 75.22%. This 
inc rease  i n  p r o f i t s  is  due t o  t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  which i n d i c a t e s  
t h a t ,  aga ins t  what it is commonly bel ieved ( 3 8 ) ,  it may be t h a t  t h e  
major sav ing  i n  moving t o  Hong Kong w i l l  probably be its lower t axes  
and not  i t s  lower labor  c o s t .  
a r t i c l e  " r e l a t i o n s  of product ion and t h e  r e l o c a t i o n  of United S t a t e s  
Manufacturing Indus t ry  s i n c e  1960", Economic Geography, Worcester, 
Massachussets, 1983.  These f i g u r e s  should be t a k e n T n t o  account only a s  
i n d i c a t i v e ,  s i n c e  they  may a l s o  r e f l e c t  d i f f e rences  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  
mix. 
(37) I n  Hong Kong, it should be noted t h a t  t h e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  cos t  w i l l  
i nc rease  d rama t i ca l ly ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  cos t  of land. 
(38) see for example M .  S to rpe r  and R .  Walker, The S p a t i a l  Divis ion of 
Labor and t h e  Location of I n d u s t r i e s ,  i n  L.  Sawers and W. K .  Tabb, 
Sunbelt  Snowbelt: 'Urban Development and Regional Rest ruc tur ing ,  New 
York, Oxford Univers i ty  Press, i984 
-___I  
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The above examples have been elaborated in  order t o  demonstrate how 
taxes can be important a s  a cost  savings, e spec ia l ly  a t  an in t e rna t iona l  
leve l .  However, it should be noted t h a t  i f  we measure only one f a c t o r ,  
we a r e  not capable of measuring the r e a l  e f f e c t  of t h a t  f ac to r .  To show 
the  r e a l  impact t h a t  taxes can have it i s  necesary t o  ca l cu la t e  the  
increase i n  p r o f i t s  i n  combination with any o ther  cos t  saving. For 
. example, i f  we consider i n  t h e  Hong Kong case t h e  f u l l  e f f e c t  of very 
low t axes  and low labor cos t ,  t h e  increase i n  p r o f i t s  w i l l  be of 
291.27%, an increase much more s i g n i f i c a n t  than t h e  one due t o  any of 




This study concludes t h a t  t a x  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  may be an important 
loca t iona l  f a c t o r ,  not only i n  intrametropolitan loca t ion ,  but a l s o  a t  
o the r  s p a t i a l  s ca l e s .  T h i s  conclusion is  reached because t a x  
d i f f e r e n t i a l s  i n  many cases can increase o r  decrease p r o f i t s  more than 
any other  cos t  d i f f e r e n t i a l .  T h i s  r e s u l t  is  p a r t i c u l a r l y  relevant fo r  
those business whose revenues do not depend on being i n  a s p e c i f i c  
loca t ion .  In  terms of number of establishments they may not be very 
important. But i n  terms of employment, they may represent a la rge  
proportion of manufacturing and wholesale. And among manufacturing, t he  
high technology firms may be one of t he  sec to r s  more s e n s i t i v e  t o  t a x  
d i f f e r e n t i a l s .  If t h i s  is t r u e ,  t h e  relevance of t h e  influence of taxes 
on manufacturlng location w i l l  be very important, s ince  it is a key 
s e c t o r  of t h e  economy i n  t h e  sense t h a t  technica l  change and i n d u s t r i a l  
innovation a r e  e s s e n t i a l  t o  t he  product iv i ty  and growth of t h e  na t iona l  
economy, and because according t o  t h e  J o i n t  Economic Committee on high 
technology, "About 75% of t h e  ne t  increase i n  manufacturing jobs from 
1955 t o  1979 i s  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  expansion i n  t h e  emerging high 
technology industrnes (39 1". 
The above conclusion does not imply t h a t  a j u r i s d i c t i o n  with high 
taxes should reduce i t s  t a x  burden. That depends on each individual 
case.  I t  has t o  be noted t h a t  low t axes ,  taken by themselves, a r e  not a 
guarantee of economic prosper i ty .  I t  is  a l s o  necessary t o  have t h e  
( 3 9 )  U.S. Congress, J o i n t  Economic Committee, I,ocatilon of High 
Technology Firrns si. Regional Economic Development, U.S. Government 
P r in t ing  Office,Washington, D . C . ,  1982 ,  p.36 
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"necesary condi t ions"  before  t h e  t a x  incen t ives  can work. Some of t h e  
condi t ions  a r e  common t o  most bus inesses ,  such a s  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  or  a 
minimun l e v e l  of bus iness .  Others a r e  s p e c i f i c  for some kind of 
businesses  as ,  f o r  example, proximity t o  high q u a l i t y  academic cen te r s  
for high-tech i n d u s t r i e s .  
But because tax d i f f e r e n t i a l s  a r e  an important propor t ion  of 
p r o f i t s ,  it can not  be s a i d  any more t h a t  "taxes and f i n a n c i a l  
inducements seem t o  be,  a t  b e s t ,  t i e - b r e a k e r s  a c t i n g  between otherwise 
equal  towns or c i t i e s  (40 ) "  In  many cases ,  r e l a t i v e l y  lower taxes  may 
compensate for  some o t h e r  cos t  such a s  labor  or  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  which are  
r e l a t i v e l y  h igher .  For t h i s  reason,  f i s ca l  inducements may be e f f e c t i v e  
i n  t h e i r  goa l  of r e t a i n i n g ,  a t t r a c t i n g  o r  encouraging t h e  formation of 
bus inesses .  But because many firms may be more s e n s i t i v e  t o  markets,  t o  
any o t h e r  cost d i f f e r e n t i a l s ,  o r  t o  any o t h e r  f a c t o r  t h a t  in f luence  
l o c a t i o n ,  any f i s c a l  inducement p o l i c i e s  should be very r e s t r i c t i v e  i n  
t h e  sense  t h a t  they should only he lp  businesses  who otherwise whould not  
l o c a t e  t h e r e .  I f  t h i s  i s  not  t h e  case ,  t h e  inc rease  i n  revenues brought 
i n t o  a j u r i s d i c t i o n  by t h e  p l a n t s  t h a t  could have loca ted  t h e r e  o r  moved 
elsewhere may not  exceed t h e  revenue foregone from p l a n t s  t h a t  would 
have loca ted  t h e r e  i n  any case .  
1 
( 4 0 )  Roger W .  Schmtmner, EIaking Business Location Decision?, Englewood 
C l i f f s ,  N e w  Jersey, Prent ice-Hal l ,  Inc ,  1952, p .  51 
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